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REDEMPTIONS FROM JUDICIAL SALES
UNDER THE LAWS OF ILLINOIS.
Herbert Becker*
and
George E. Harbert**
N OTHING is more perplexing than the state of our
laws of redemption from judicial sales. The sub-
ject is very large and the problems very numerous. It
was our thought that in view of the fact that scarcely
anything exists in published form on the subject, a com-
prehensive analysis of our laws would be helpful to
the bar.
General Observations
Redemption, in its broadest sense, means the repay-
ment of any loan or the payment of any debt, but in
the commonly accepted meaning to which we have occa-
sion to refer, redemption means the statutory right given
to various parties to redeem from a judicial sale. This
right being purely statutory, cannot be exercised except
within the period of time and in the manner substan-
tially as pointed out in the statute. (Chicago Savings
Bank and Trust Co. v. Coleman, 283 Ill. 611).
The purpose of redemption is to subject the prop-
erty of the debtor to the payment of as many debts as
possible and to accomplish this end the Statutes are
liberally construed. (Level v. Goosman, 285 Ill. 347.
Garden City Sand Co. v. Christley, 289 I11. 617).
The right of redemption arises by virtue of two sec-
tions of the Statute. The first is Section 16, Chapter
77, Cahill's 1927 Statutes, which was construed in Locey
Coal Mines v. C. W. & B. Coal Company, 131 Ill. 9,
*Vice President, Chicago Title & Trust Co.
"'Title Officer, Chicago Title & Trust Co.
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as being an absolute grant of redemption from all judi-
cial sales, the Court saying: "The language of the
Statute is imperative and seems to contemplate no ex-
ceptions." The other is Section 24, Chapter 95, Ca-
hill's 1927 Statutes, which was passed in 1879 abro-
gating the power of sale in any mortgage, trust deed or
other conveyance in the nature of a mortgage, and
which provided that no real estate should be sold to
satisfy any such mortgage or other debt, except in pur-
suance of a judgment or decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction. The statutory right to redeem is abso-
lute and the parties cannot by contract destroy it.
(Bearss v. Ford, 108 Ill. 16 and Tennery v. Nicholson,
87 Ill. 464). Regardless of the form which the con-
veyance may take, if it is in fact a mortgage, it must
be foreclosed with the consequent attendant right of
redemption. (Devoigne v. Chicago Title and Trust
Company, 304 Ill. 177). So even though a deed is a
warranty deed absolute on its face, if it is in fact a mort-
gage, that is, if in fact the deed was given as security
for a debt, it must be foreclosed. In such case, the
grantor in the deed may file a bill asking for the right
to redeem, or if he fails or refuses to do so, a judgment
creditor may file such a bill. (Morgan v. Carson, 214
Ill. App. 569).
Before proceeding, it might be well to define some of
the terms which we shall use hereafter in order to avoid
confusion or the necessity of repetition. The owner of
the equity of redemption, commonly known as the owner
of the fee, becomes, upon the entry of a decree of sale,
the owner of the right to redeem. The holder of this
right to redeem is under no legal obligation to redeem
and there is no action which can be brought to compel
him to exercise his right. (Morgan v. Clayton, 61 Il.
35). This right is probably not real estate nor is it an
interest in real estate legal or equitable upon which a
judgment can become a lien. It is entirely distinct from
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what is known as the equity of redemption which was
incident to the mortgage and which was cut off by fore-
closure sale. The right of redemption is not an estate
but a mere privilege granted to the mortgagor whose
equity of redemption has been foreclosed. The stat-
utory right of redemption cannot be sold on execution.
(People for the use of Fortune Brothers Brewing Com-
pany v. Barett, 165 Ill. App. 94 and Hill v. Blackwelder,
113 Ill. 283). However, there are cases which hold
that since the certificate of sale is nothing more than a
right either to the redemption money or to a deed, in
case no redemption is made, the title of the holder of
the right to redeem is, in fact, a fee title, and that if
the master's deed is never issued to the purchaser at the
foreclosure sale, the title remains in the holder of the
right to redeem and does not revest in him. In other
words, he never loses his title until a master's deed actu-
ally issues. (Schroeder v. Bozarth, 224 Ill. 310 and
Sutherland v. Long, 273 Ill. 309). In this discussion,
however, we shall call the owner of this right to re-
deem, the owner of the fee title.
It is also necessary to point out the distinguishing fea-
tures between a decree of foreclosure and a judgment.
A decree is entered by a court of equity and except
where expressly made so by statute is not a lien. A de-
cree of foreclosure is in the nature of a decree in rem
and is not a decree for the payment of money, but is
an alternative one ordering in default of the payment
of money, the sale of certain specific property. Such a
decree does not in itself create a lien. It is not such a
judicial order upon which an execution may be sued out
or which may be made the basis of a levy. (Illinois Na-
tional Bank v. School Trustees, 211 Ill. 500). The de-
cree is the basis for the sale only of a certain specific
piece of property therein described and must contain
clear and explicit directions as to how and when it shall
be sold. Thus a decree of foreclosure ordering the sale
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of the property of the debtor "in accordance with the
Statutes" is invalid. (Crosby v. Kiest, 135 Ill. 458).
Under a decree of foreclosure only the property de-
scribed in the decree may be sold. Other property not
described in the decree belonging to the debtor cannot be
sold to satisfy the decree. A decree of foreclosure
never outlaws, the seven year limitation upon judgments
having no effect upon decrees of foreclosure. (Kirby v.
Runols, 140 Ill. 289).
It is not until a sale of the specific property in ques-
tion has been had and the sale was for an amount in-
sufficient to satisfy the decree that a so-called deficiency
decree may be entered, which decree is a money decree
pure and simple and then for the first time assumes the
nature of a judgment.
A decree of foreclosure moreover can be entered upon
service by publication but in such case, no deficiency de-
cree may be entered against the parties served by pub-
lication. This rule was first laid down in the old and
celebrated case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 and
has never been questioned. The difference of course, is
that the decree of foreclosure is a decree in rem, while
the deficiency decree is one in personam. (Northern
Trust Company v. Sanford, 308 Ill. 381).
These are the important features of a decree of fore-
closure which have a bearing on our discussion. It is,
of course, well understood that a judgment is also the
basis of a sale from which redemption may be made. A
judgment is a purely statutory creature. It differs from
a decree of foreclosure in this important respect-it is,
by statute, a lien on all of the real property of the
debtor, whether owned at the time the judgment was
rendered or acquired subsequent thereto. A sale under
a judgment is governed by the terms of the statute which.
must be followed, whereas a sale under a foreclosure
decree is governed by the terms of the decree as we
have pointed out.
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Another important point which must be remembered
is the difference in the mechanics of redemption exist-
ing by virtue of the Statute of 1917 dealing with judg-
ments and decrees. This statute was repealed in 1921
restoring the law to the condition existing prior to 1917.
The repealing statute of 1921, however, contained a
savings clause by which the machinery of the 1917 Stat-
ute was saved for mortgages made between July 1, 1917,
and June 30, 1921, or judgments rendered during that
period. The limitations of space will not permit us to
go into a discussion of redemptions under the 1917 Act
and it is therefore to be understood that we are dealing
with redemptions under the present statutes and those
which existed prior to 1917.
One more point must be borne in mind. That is,
a decree and sale thereunder supersedes the mortgage
upon which it is based and the identity of such mortgage
is completely lost. The mortgage and the liability there-
under is merged in the decree. Thus, a sale under such
a decree exonerates the property from the lien of the in-
debtedness and the subsequent rights of the creditors are
determined solely by the decree and not by the terms of
the original mortgage. (Lightcap v. Bradley, 186 Ill.
510). But until the sale of the property is completed,
the entry of a decree does not extinguish the lien and
the creditor may abandon his proceedings and sue upon
his note at law. (Morgan v. Sherwood, 53 Ill. 171).
Nor does the fact that a judgment has been obtained
upon the note sought to be foreclosed bar a foreclosure
decree. (Van Sant v. Almon, 23 Ill. 30. Banchard v.
Kohn, 157 Ill. 579). Thereafter, the trust deed or
mortgage remains as security for the judgment and may
be foreclosed to satisfy the judgment. But a sale of
real estate either under a judgment or a decree satisfies
such judgment or decree as to the property described in
the decree or which the judgment creditor selected for
sale and forever frees such property from the mortgage
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foreclosed or the judgment. In other words, even though
the sale did not produce enough to pay the decree or
judgment in full, the mortgagee or judgment creditor
cannot resort a second time to the property thus sold for
the payment of his deficiency. His remedies are ex-
hausted as to that property. This rules is subject to one
exception only, and that is, if the debtor who is pri-
marily liable for the debt which was the basis of the
sale, acquires the title subsequent to the sale by redemp-
tion or otherwise, the property in his hands is liable for
the unpaid balance of the debt, that is, for the defi-
ciency, and may again be subjected to sale for the pay.
ment thereof. (Ogle v. Koeiner, 140 Ill. 170, Strause
v. Dutch 250 Ill. 326).
Redemption Within Twelve Months
Redemptions fall in two great classes:
(1) Redemptions within twelve months after sale,
and
(2) Redemptions after twelve months after the sale
and within fifteen months.
The effect upon the title to real estate of these two
classes of redemptions is entirely different. The differ-
ence may be tersely stated to be that by redemption
within the twelve months period no matter by whom
made, no title is acquired by the redemptioner, whereas
by virtue of a redemption properly made and completed
after the twelve months period, the redemptioner ac-
quires the title to the property. With this important
distinction constantly in mind, we now proceed to dis-
cuss first the redemptions which may be made within
the twelve months period.
The statute gives the right to redeem to "any defend-
ant, his heirs, administrators, assigns or any person in-
terested in the premises through or under the defend-
ant."
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Perhaps the simplest form of redemption which is en-
countered is a redemption made by the owner of the
title to the property within twelve months after the ju-
dicial sale has been made under a decree of foreclosure
or under a judgment. For the purposes of redemption
twelve months begins and ends upon the same date.
Thus, if a sale of the premises be made on February
1st of one year, a redemption by the owner of the
equity may be made on February ist of the succeeding
year, this being the last day considered to be within the
twelve months period. (Roan v. Rohrer, 72 I1l. 582).
In order to make a redemption under the statute, it
is only necessary for the redemptioner to pay the amount
for which the property was sold without regard to the
amount of the decree. (Ogle v. Koerner, 140 Ill. 170).
The redemption wipes out the sale and if the sale
was sufficient to pay the judgment or decree in full, no
question arises. The title is in the same position as if
the judgment or decree had been paid before the sale
and since the debt upon which the decree is rendered has
become merged into the decree, this obligation disap-
pears. (Butler v. Brown, 205 Ill. 606). In case of a
foreclosure of a first mortgage on property upon which
there is also a second mortgage, the effect of a redemp-
tion by the owner of the fee title may vary according
to different circumstances. If the second mortgagee did
not file a cross-bill to foreclose his mortgage and the
decree is confined to the foreclosure of the first mort-
gage, then the redemption by the owner of the title has
this effect :-If the sale is for the full amount of the
first mortgage, his redemption re-instates the second
mortgage. If the sale is insufficient to pay the first mort-
gage and he is not personally liable on the first mort-
gage, his redemption re-instates the second mortgage
and he takes free from the deficiency on the first mort-
gage. If he is personally liable on the first mortgage,
his redemption from a sale for less than the amount due
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on the first mortgage re-instates the second mortgage
and the deficiency on the first becomes a lien on his title.
But the results are different in case the second mortgagee
files a cross-bill and the decree provides for the sale of
the property to satisfy both the first and second mort-
gages. It, under such circumstances, the sale is for the
full amount due on the first and second mortgages, the
redemption by the owner of the fee simple wipes out
the foreclosure. If the sale is for less than the amount
due the first and second mortgages and if the owner of
the fee is not personally liable for the debts, his re-
demption frees the property from the lien of the mort-
gages and the deficiency on the sale. If, however, the
owner of the fee is personally liable for the debts and
redeems trom a sale for less than the amount due under
the decree foreclosing the first and second mortgages,
he takes the title subject to a charge for the unpaid bal-
ance. (Ogle v. Koerner, Supra. Easter v. Holcomb,
221 Ill. App. 485).
In other words, in case of a redemption by the owner
of the fee, the title remains in him freed from those
debts upon which the sale was based and for which he
was not personally liable, but subject, of course, to all
junior encumbrances and liens which, though they might
have been cut off by the issuance of a master's deed,
were not cut off because of the redemption by the
owner.
If, however, he is liable personally to pay the debt
which was the basis of such judgment or decree, as for
example, if he is the mortgagor or has purchased fhe
property and has assumed and agreed to pay the en-
cumbrance, (Miller v. Thompson, 34 Mich. 10, Albany
City Savings Institute v. Burdick, 87 N. Y. 40) the sale
for less than the amount of the decree or judgment does
not extinguish the debt. In Strause v. Dutch, 250 Ill.
326 at page 330, the Court speaking of this situation
says: "Upon the sale of the premises under the fore-
132 REDEMPTIONS FROM JUDICIAL SALES
closure decree, the liens of the two trust deeds upon
which the foreclosure suit was predicated were extin-
guished. Those liens no longer existed and the com-
plainant in the foreclosure suit had secured every bene-
fit possible to be secured under such liens. The debt it-
self, however, was not extinguished. A portion of it
remained unsatisfied by reason of the failure of the
property to sell for the full amount of the indebtedness.
Under such circumstances, the creditor if personal serv-
ice has been had upon the debtor, may have a deficiency
decree for the balance due upon which execution may
issue as on a money decree, (Hurd's Statute 1909,
Chapter 95, Section 16), or he may bring his action
at law and secure judgment for the balance due. Such
deficiency decree or judgment is secured by no lien what-
ever. It is not based upon the lien of the mortgage but
upon the personal liability of the mortgagor to pay the
full amount of the indebtedness secured by the mort-
gage. A creditor with such a decree or judgment is on
the same footing with any other decree or judgment
creditor of the debtor and is entitled to employ the
same means to enforce his decree or judgment."
These principles which we have deemed to be thor-
oughly established seem to have been somewhat shaken
by the decision of Hack v. Snow in the Appellate Court
of Illinois, First District, handed down on February
27, 1929, and reported in 252 Ill. App. 51. The facts
briefly were that a decree of foreclosure was rendered
on a mortgage in a proceeding to which a judgment
creditor having a lien on the title was made a party de-
fendant. A sale was had under the decree of fore-
closure and the property was sold at the sale for an
amount sufficient to satisfy the mortgage. The owner
of the equity during the period of redemption conveyed
to another who was not personally liable to pay the
judgment of the defendant judgment creditor. The
grantee redeemed within the twelve months and the
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Court held that the judgment creditor was cut out and
his lien was lost. The significant paragraph of the de-
cision reads as follows:
"In order for the defendant Liesik (judgment creditor) to
preserve any right he may have had in his judgment against the
mortgaged property he should have bid at the foreclosure sale
as provided by statute. Having failed to do so, he lost all in-
terest and lien upon the real estate sold in the foreclosure pro-
ceeding."
This case stands by itself in Illinois and is directly
contrary to several decisions by our Supreme Court. They
are: Davenport v. Karnes, 70 Ill. 465, and Burgett v.
Paxton, 99 Ill. 288. In the Davenport case the Court
said:
"As before said, under the statute upon this redemption the
sale became null and void. This being so, the premises were
as though no levy and sale had been made and became liable to
levy and sale on the execution issued on the larger judgment,
as that judgment was a lien upon the premises at the time of
the conveyance by the judgment debtor."
In other words the Court held that the redemption
within the twelve months reinstates any liens which exist
upon the property. Under these decisions the holding
in the Hack case should have been that redemption by
the grantee of the owner of the equity within the twelve
months period left the title in said grantee subject to the
lien of Liesik's judgment. If the judgment creditor in
the Hack case had filed a cross-bill and the decree had
been on the bill and the cross-bill and had directed a sale
to satisfy both the mortgage and the judgment, a de-
cision would have been justified holding that a redemp-
tion by the grantee not personally liable for the judg-
ment relieved the title of the judgment lien. If the prin-
ciple of law laid down in this case prevails, then every
second mortgagee must bid at a first mortgage fore-
closure sale enough money to pay the first mortgage
and his second mortgage. Otherwise a grantee of the
owner of the equity or the owner of the equity if they
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are not personally liable on the second mortgage will
redeem and take free and clear of the second mortgage.
This is not the law as we have shown and it is hoped
that the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to con-
sider this case and render a correct decision therein.
We pass now to the rights of persons other than the
owner of the title to redeem within the twelve months
period. We have quoted the statute. Its language is
"any defendant, his heirs, administrators, assigns or any
person interested through or under the defendant."
This is a broad class of persons. But no matter who re-
deems within the twelve months, the title remains in the
owner of the fee and does not change or pass to any
one else by virtue of the redemption. Whoever redeems
as a defendant within the twelve months period redeems
from the sale and pays the amount thereof. The effect
of such redemption on the rights accruing to the re-
demptioner vary with the different defendants redeem-
ing. The rights of the owner of the equity redeeming
have already been explained. The rights of a junior en-
cumbrancer redeeming within the twelve months are en-
tirely different from those of the owner. Likewise, the
rights of a tenant are different from those of the owner
or junior encumbrancer who redeems. The section is
so broad that it gives rise to various academic questions.
For instance, a party having no interest, yet being a de-
fendant, might be considered as having a right to re-
deem. If he did, he probably would be a mere volun-
teer and, of course, would obtain no title as we have
pointed out. Under the designation of "any person in-
terested" in the premises, it has been held that a woman
having an inchoate right of dower may redeem in sal-
vage of her dower. (Biyoness v. Hibbard, 267 Ill.
301).
It is easily conceivable that tenants might under cer-
tain circumstances redeem. For instance, the lessee un-
der a favorable long term lease, subject to a trust deed
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upon the fee might redeem from a foreclosure in order
to preserve the title of his lessor and so prevent his lease
being destroyed by foreclosure. He could, undoubtedly,
under most leases or in equity withhold the money so
advanced for redemption from his future payments of
rent and in so doing protect his lease at no ultimate ex-
pense to himself.
But next in importance to the redemption by the owner
of the fee is the redemption by a junior mortgagee or
lienor. We shall, therefore, turn our attention to the
rights which flow from such a redemption. Here again
we must state at the outset that a junior mortgagee or
lienor obtains no title by redeeming from the sale of a
prior lien. His sole right is to become subrogated to
the rights of the party from whom he has thus redeemed
and to add to his own mortgage the amount redeemed
and foreclose again for the amount of his mortgage plus
the redemption money. (Illinois National Bank V.
Trustees of Schools, 211, Ill. 500).
An interesting situation arises where a junior encum-
brancer redeems from a prior sale but there are inter-
vening junior encumbrances having liens superior to
that of the redeeming lienor. To illustrate this, let us
assume there are three mortgages upon a particular
piece of property held by "A", "B" and "C". "A" fore-
closes and "C" redeems from the sale, what are the
rights of "B"? The title upon such a redemption re-
mains in the owner of the fee and "C" having redeemed,
is subrogated to the rights of "A". "C" thereupon pro-
ceeds to foreclose his mortgage plus the redemption
money advanced by him. "B", however, can redeem
from the foreclosure sale of "C" by merely paying the
redemption money advanced by "C" and "B" is not re-
quired to pay "C's" mortgage in making such redemp-
tion because "C's" mortgage is subordinate to the mort-
gage of "B". See Illinois National Bank v. School
Trustees, 211 Ill. 500.
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Another interesting situation was decided in the case
of Flachs v. Kelly and others, 30 Ill. 462. In this case,
Theis, owning the property in question, executed two
mortgages, the first to Kelly and the second to Flachs.
Subsequent to these two mortgages, a judgment was ren-
dered against the owner and in favor of Chatten. The
owner of the first mortgage foreclosed his mortgage and
the property was sold. The owner of the second mort-
gage then forecloses his mortgage and purchased the
property at his own sale. He then made a re-
demption within the twelve months period from the
sale under the first mortgage foreclosure. The judg-
ment creditor, after the expiration of the twelve
months period from the second mortgage foreclos-
ure sale, tendered to the Sheriff sufficient money
to redeem the property only from the second mortgage
sale contending that as a judgment creditor, he was
entitled to redeem by paying the amount of money for
which the property was sold under the second mortgage
and need not pay the money advanced by the holder of
the certificate of sale to redeem the property from the
sale under the first mortgage. The Court held adversely
to him and declared that in order to redeem from the
sale under the second mortgage, he must pay not only
the amount of that sale but also the amount of the re-
demption money which the second mortgage advanced
to redeem from the first mortgage sale.
It remains now to explain briefly the method of effect-
ing a redemption within the twelve months period. The
redemption is made by paying the money to the Master,
who thereupon files for record, a certificate of redemp-
tion. A redemption may also be effected by purchasing
the certificate of sale from the holder thereof and ob-
taining an assignment thereof. (Casper National Bank
v. Jenner, 268 Ill. 142). It is better practice to endorse
upon the back of said certificate of sale, so assigned, a
brief statement of the intention by the owner to redeem
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and to record the certificate so endorsed but this is un-
necessary except as a matter of notice, and if the certifi-
cate is surrendered even though not recorded with the
assignment attached thereto, the redemption takes effect
as between the parties and as to all parties who may
have or may be charged with notice of the facts.
(Casper National Bank v. Jenner, Supra). However,
under such a state of facts, if the certificate of redemp-
tion is not recorded and a judgment creditor has no
actual notice of such an assignment and redemption, he
is not bound by the redemption and may after the ex-
piration of twelve months proceed to redeem as if no
redemption had been made. (Boyton v. Pierce, 151
Ill. 197).
A different situation arises where a junior encum-
brancer purchases the certificate of sale issued under the
foreclosure of a prior lien. We have shown that he has
the right to redeem from a sale under a prior mortgage
and by such redemption place the title in the owner of
the fee subject to his rights to reimbursement for the re-
demption money expended, plus the amount due him on
his own mortgage. But if he purchases a prior certifi-
cate of sale there is no implication that he intended to
make a redemption. Of course, in such a case, if no re-
demption is made from the sale, he will be entitled to a
Master's deed at the end of the fifteen months period.
But such a purchase of a prior certificate of sale is very
unwise because a judgment creditor may redeem after
the twelve months, if there has been no redemption
within the twelve months. Under this situation, the
judgment creditor redeeming after the twelve months
would only have to pay the amount necessary to redeem
from the sale without taking into consideration the
original debt of the junior encumbrancer who has pur-
chased the certificate of sale and the junior mortgagee
would lose the amount of his junior mortgage. This
precise case was presented to the Supreme Court in
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Shroeder v. Bauer, 140 Ill. 135 and the Court in decid-
ing this situation and laying down the principles set
forth above, said: "But the appellee contends, that by
taking an assignment of this certificate of sale, he had in
effect redeemed the land and it was then subject to his
mortgage, which could not be defeated by a judgment
creditor. He is the second mortgagee, and he purchased
the elder certificate of purchase, and would have been
entitled to a deed under the statute at the end of fifteen
months if no judgment creditor had redeemed, and
would have thus cut off all subsequent encumbrances.
This he had the unquestioned right to do; but, having
failed to acquire title in that way, in consequence of the
redemption by the appellant, a judgment creditor, he
can not now claim that he merely redeemed as the mort-
gagee of Davenport, and in this way annulled the sale."
One more point with reference to redemption within
the twelve months period requires consideration. Quite
frequently the owner of the certificate of sale will
procure a quit-claim deed from the owner of the fee.
This probably constitutes a redemption on the theory of
merger but would seem to be subject to the same limita-
tions as if the owner of the fee purchased the certificate
of redemption and took no further steps. In such a
case, however, it is safer to treat this as a redemption
as to subordinate judgements and other liens which may
be or may claim to be revived and reinstated by such a
transaction.
REDEMPTION OF SEPARATE PARCELS
We next come to the question of redemption where
the mortgage conveyed two or more parcels of property.
Whether or not separate owners of separate parcels of
real estate which have been sold at judicial sale can re-
deem their specific parcels depends upon the manner in
which the premises were sold. If the parcels were sold
separately at the judicial sale, the owner of each sepa-
rate parcel may redeem from the sale of his parcel by
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paying only the amount for which the particular parcel
was sold. (Robertson v. Dennis, 20 Ill. 313). If,
however, the various parcels were sold en masse, they
can only be redeemed en masse and neither owner can
redeem his separate parcel. Redemption from such a
sale can be made only by paying to the Master or to the
holder of the certificate of sale, the entire amount for
which all of the property was sold. (Oldfield v. Eulert,
148 Ill. 614). In the latter case, if the owner of one
parcel redeems, the title to the parcel which he did not
own would vest in the other owner and the redemptioner
would have only a right of action to collect the propor-
tionate amount of the redemption money.
Having before us the proposition that in case of a re-
demption within the first twelve months, the title is
merely restored to or remains in the owner of the fee,
the question of the effect of a redemption by one not
entitled to make it presents little difficulty. The only
person who may question such a redemption is the
holder of the certificate of sale. If he accepts the re-
demption money no one else can complain. (Blair v.
Chamblin, 39 I11. 521). The owner of the fee, having
retained or regained his title by such redemption is not
injured and the redemptioner has only a doubtful right
of action for reimbursement. Such a redemption even
though made by a stranger cancels the certificate of sale
and prevents further redemption by judgment creditors.
This, we think, presents most of the problems which
arise in connection with redemptions within the twelve
months period.
REDEMPTION AFTER TWELVE MONTHS
At the expiration of twelve months from the date of
the sale, the right of redemption of "any defendant, his
heirs, administrators, assigns, or any person interested
in the premises through or under the defendant" is lost
and these parties are absolutely foreclosed. The right
of redemption thereafter and until the expiration of
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fifteen months from the date of the sale is given by the
Statute to judgment and decree creditors. Sections 20
to 26, Chapter 77, Cahill's Revised Statutes, deal with
this class of redemptions and it is our purpose now to
explain this branch of the subject. Redemptions by
judgment and decree creditors are far more complicated
than the redemptions made within the twelve months
period, and we hope that we may, in some measure, be
able to clarify the conflicting decisions and views which
exist in this field.
At the outset, let us emphasize that the foundation of
a redemption by a judgment or decree creditor is a valid
judgment or decree and a valid sale thereunder. With-
out that, no good redemption can be made. The im-
portance of this is that under this class of redemption,
the redemptioner obtains title to the property. Like-
wise in the case of a decree, no good title can be ob-
tained under a decree unless it is valid and the sale
thereunder is valid. The details of the operation of
these redemptions will appear as we progress, but these
points must be borne in mind throughout the discussion.
The Statute as we have shown grants the right to re-
deem to judgment and decree creditors. A judgment
creditor is altogether different from a decree creditor
and the machinery of redemption by one is wholly
different from the machinery by which the other may re-
deem.
JUDGMENT AND DECREE CREDITORS
The question as to who is a judgment creditor within
the meaning of the Statute has frequently received the
attention of the Supreme Court. It is obvious that the
line must be drawn somewhere. As was stated in Fitch
v. Wetherbee, 110 Ill. 475, "There must be some limi-
tation as to the particular judgments who are entitled to
redeem.-Whose judgment creditors are meant by this
Section? Not the judgment creditors of all the world
but only the judgment creditors of those who had a
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right to redeem." It is not necessary to entitle a judg-
ment creditor to redeem that his judgment should be a
lien upon the premises. Thus a holder of a judgment
rendered against the mortgagor after he had parted
with his title may, nevertheless, redeem from a fore-
closure of the mortgage. This was established as early
as the case of McLagan v. Brown in 11 Ill. 519 and has
been many times since adjudicated. (See Chicago Sav-
ings Bank v. Coleman, 283 Ill. 618. Garden City Sand
Company v. Christley, 289 Ill. 617. McRoberts v.
Conover, 71 Ill. 525. Lloyd v. Karnes, 45 Ill. 62).
But a judgment creditor having a judgment against a
person in the chain of title who is not the mortgagor and
who has conveyed prior to the foreclosure suit, obtained
after the conveyance, cannot redeem. A judgment
creditor whose judgment has been discharged in bank-
ruptcy may redeem under the Statute. ('ease v. Ritchie
132 Ill. 638). Of course, a judgment which is a lien
upon the premises may be the basis of a redemption. A
redemption after twelve months and prior to fifteen
months is not invalid merely because the judgment
creditor was a party to the suit and as such party might
have redeemed within the first twelve months period.
(Heinroth v. Frost, 250 Ill. 102. So too, a judgment
creditor having a judgment against a person who died
before the judgment creditor could make a redemption
may still redeem after the death of the judgment debtor.
(Zeman v. Ward, 260 Ill. 93) and by virtue of Section
27 of the Judgment Act, persons having claims against
a deceased debtor which have been allowed in the
Probate Court may, by following the method therein
provided, make such redemption, even though such
claim has arisen since the death of the deceased debtor,
namely, one for funeral expenses. (Zeman v. Ward,
Supra).
In order to entitle a judgment creditor to redeem, it
is not necessary that the judgment be rendered prior to
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the decree of foreclosure. In fact, a judgment entered
after expiration of twelve months from the date of sale
and subsequent, therefore, to the time when the judg-
ment debtor himself might have redeemed is a valid
basis for redemption. (Strauss v. Tuckhorn, 200 Ill.
75. Kufke v. Blume, 304 I1l. 288). It is possible that
under the provisions for successive redemptions, a judg-
ment creditor might obtain a judgment more than fifteen
months after the sale of the mortgaged property and
still have a right to redeem. This interesting situation
arose in Meier v. Hilton reported in 257 Ill. 174.
It is no bar to a valid redemption that the debtor per-
mitted the judgment to be entered against him for the
sole purpose of effecting redemption if the judgment is
based on a bona fide debt. (Kufke v. Blume, 304 Ill.
288).
If the owner of the title conveys his title within the
twelve months period, a judgment creditor having a
judgment against the grantee may, upon the failure of
his judgment debtor to do so, redeem from the fore-
closure. (Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Beckman,
210 Ill. 394.
However, in order to entitle a judgment or decree
creditor to redeem, he must have such a judgment or
decree as would authorize a sale of the premises sought
to be redeemed. Thus, a judgment creditor whose
judgment has become dormant by the expiration of time
so that an execution cannot be sued out upon it, cannot
redeem. And a decree creditor whose decree does not
authorize a sale of the premises sought to be redeemed
cannot redeem. (DeWitt County Bank v. Mickelberry,
244 Ill. 77). Thus, the owner of a decree of fore-
closure of a junior mortgage directing the sale of
premises therein described has a right to redeem as a
decree creditor from the sale of the premises under the
foreclosure of a prior mortgage and it is not necessary
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before redeeming that a sale be first made under the
junior mortgage decree, nor is it necessary that such
decree be a lien.
A decree creditor whose decree authorizes a sale of
the premises may redeem the premises to the exclusion
of other creditors whose claims are allowed in the same
decree. Thus, if the premises are sold upon a fore-
closure of a first mortgage and another foreclosure in-
volving the same premises should proceed to a decree in
which several creditors have their respective debts estab-
lished and a decree entered in their favor, any one of
such creditors may redeem as a decree creditor and his
redemption operates as if he had obtained a decree in
an independent action for his sole benefit and such re-
demption will not be for the benefit of the other cred-
itors whose debts form part of the same decree.
(Morava v. Bonner, 205 Ill. 321. Whitehead v. Hall,
148 Ill. 253).
In a late case, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that
a deficiency decree creditor may redeem from his own
sale, provided, however, that at the time of deficiency
decree was entered, the person primarily liable for the
debt was the holder of the title. (Strause v. Dutch,
250 Ill. 326). This case is one of the leading cases on
redemption in this State and is often cited. The Court
carefully distinguished this case from those cases in
which the rule was laid down that property could not be
twice sold for the same debt, stating that such redemp-
tion was not based upon the lien of the mortgage but
upon the personal liability of the mortgagor to pay the
full amount of the indebtedness secured by the mort-
gage. The Court said a creditor with such a decree or
judgment is on the same footing as any other judgment
or decree creditor and is entitled to employ the same
means to enforce his decreee or judgment.
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MACHINERY OF REDEMPTION BY JUDGMENT
CREDITORS
For the machinery of redemption by judgment and
decree creditors, we must turn to the Statute. Section
20, Chapter 77, Cahill's 1927 Statutes, provides that
the judgment creditor may sue out an execution upon his
judgment or decree, place the same in the hands of the
sheriff, who executes it and makes a levy upon the
premises desired to be redeemed. The person desiring
to redeem then pays to the sheriff the amount necessary
to redeem the premises from the foreclosure sale. It is
important that the amount so deposited be sufficient to
pay the decree with interest thereon at the rate of six
per cent per annum. In this connection, the provisions
of Section 28 of the Judgment Act must be considered.
This Section provides that the holder of the certificate
of sale may pay all taxes and special assessments which
are or may become a lien on the real estate during the
period of redemption. When he had done so and has
deposited his receipts with the master, the redemptioner
must reimburse him before he is entitled to redeem. In
all cases of redemption, therefore, the master who made
the original sale must be consulted in order that the de-
posit shall be great enough to cover these additional
items, if any there are. Otherwise, the holder of the
certificate could rightfully refuse the money tendered
and at the end of fifteen months insist upon a deed from
the master. Of course, if the holder of the certificate
accepts the redemption money, he cannot later complain
that it is inadequate. When the proper amount has been
deposited with the sheriff or other proper officer, he
then advertises and offers the premises for sale as in
other cases of sale on execution. The sale is by virtue
of the redemption and pursuant to the execution. At
such sale, the redeeming creditor is considered to have
bid the amount of such redemption money so paid by
him with interest, and if no greater bid is received the
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judgment creditor is immediately entitled to a deed and
no further redemption is allowed. If, however, a bid is
received greater thian the amount of such redemption
money, the property is sold to the highest bidder and
the purchaser receives another certificate of sale from
which any judgment creditor may redeem within sixty
days. This is provided for by Section 23, the language
of which is that: "Successive redemptions may be made
of the premises at any time within sixty days of the last
sale at which they were sold for more than the amount
of the redemption money, interests and costs and the
premises again sold in the same manner and upon the
same terms and conditions, and certificates shall be
made in like form and manner as upon the sale on the
first redemption, and the person redeeming shall be con-
sidered to have bid the amount of his redemption
money, interest and costs; and if at any such sale the
premises are not sold for a greater sum, the sheriff or
other officer shall forthwith execute a deed to the pur-
chaser, and no other redemption shall be allowed."
Under this Section, it is possible that successive re-
demptions may extend the period of redemption many
months beyond the fifteen months period. For instance,
if at the first redemption sale more than the redemption
money is bid, the sheriff does not issue a deed, but issues
a certificate of sale to the purchaser at the redemption
sale. From the time of this sale, there is a further
sixty day period of redemption. If, within that period,
another judgment creditor redeems, he proceeds in ex-
actly the same manner as the first creditor and again a
sale is conducted by virtue of the redemption and the
execution of the second creditor. If, at this sale, more
than the redemption money is bid, the same process is
again gone through. This continues until either one of
two things happens. First, if at the redemption sale,
no more than the redemption money is bid, a deed is is-
sued forthwith. Secondly, if the sixty day period of
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redemption expires without a further redemption being
made therefrom, a deed is issued to the purchaser.
When either of these two events happen, all further
rights of redemption terminate.
MACHINERY OF REDEMPTION BY DECREE CREDITORS
The machinery of redemption by decree creditors is
different from the machinery of redemption by a judg-
ment creditor. The difficulty with the redemption by a
decree creditor is that the statute fails to outline the
manner in which he shall proceed. The language of the
Statute (Section 20) is important to note. It is that
"any judgment or decree creditor, his executors, admin-
istrators or assigns may, after the expiration of twelve
months and within fifteen months after the sale, redeem
the premises in the following manner: Such creditor,
his executors, administrators, or assigns may sue out
an execution upon his judgment or decree, and place the
same in the hands of the Sheriff or other proper officer
to execute the same, who shall endorse upon the back
thereof a levy of the premises desired to be redeemed."
The statute as may be seen is wholly inapplicable to a
redemption by a decree creditor. A decree creditor can-
not sue out an execution and levy on property. The pro-
cedure for redemption by a decree creditors has, in fact,
been outlined by our Supreme Court in the case of
Whitehead v. Hall, 148 Ill. page 253, which is the only
case on this subject. There the Court held that a decree
creditor may redeem from a prior sale by depositing the
redemption money with the Master who is named in
his decree to sell the property described in his decree.
The Master, upon the receipt of the redemption money
proceeds to sell under the decree held by the redeeming
decree creditor. From this point the procedure is the
same as in the case of redemption by judgment credi-
tors. At the sale, of course, any one may bid and it will
be considered that the decree creditor bid the amount
of the redemption money. If no more than the redemp-
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tion money is bid the Master issues a deed forthwith to
the redeeming decree creditor. If more than the re-
demption money is bid then the Master issues a certi-
ficate of sale and there is a sixty day period for further
redemptions. When this sixty day period has expired
and no further redemption has been made the Master
issues a deed to the redeeming decree creditor.
PREFERENCES IN REDEMPTIONS
A redemption by a judgment creditor cuts out judg-
ments and other encumbrances even though they were
prior to the judgment upon which such redemption is
made. In this respect, this kind of redemption is ma-
terially different from a redemption made within the
twelve months period. Thus, a judgment creditor un-
der a judgment rendered fourteen months after the fore-
closure sale might by such redemption obtain the title
to the property free and clear of prior judgments and
other encumbrances in favor of persons who have not
elected to redeem. The effect of such redemption is to
transfer to the redeeming creditor all rights belonging
to the original purchaser at the time the redemption is
made so that if the judgment is regularly obtained and
will support a sale and deed, the judgment creditor who
redeems obtains the same title which the original pur-
chaser would have obtained under a deed issued by the
Master. (Sutherland v. Long, 273 Ill. 309).
The statute, however, affords ample protection for
senior judgment creditors against a redemption by a
junior judgment creditor which would cut off their judg-
ments. Section 24 of the Judgment Act (Chapter 77,
Cahill's Statutes) provides that each judgment creditor
has two days immediately following the expiration of
the twelve months period in the order of their priority
within which they may redeem. So that if there are
six judgment creditors who are entitled to redeem from
a foreclosure sale, each one of them has two days in
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which his right to redeem is paramount to the right to
redeem of any other judgment creditor in the order of
their seniority, the senior judgment having the first two
days and the second one the next two days, etc. If a
creditor, being for instance, the fifth creditor, should
make redemption on the first day after the end of the
twelve months period his certificate is subject to the rights
of creditors Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 to redeem within the
two days alloted to each of them. This they may do
by paying the amount of the foreclosure sale plus inter-
est and cost as if the redemption had not been made by
creditor No. 5. (See Chicago Savings Bank v. Cole-
man, 283 Ill. 611). This is a leading case on prefer-
ences of redemption and suggests a very interesting ques-
tion. It was held that the date of priority of the judg-
ment was governed not by the date of the rendition
thereof but by the date upon which said judgment be-
came a lien. Thus in this case, it was decided that a
judgment rendered in Cook County but upon which no
transcript was filed in Sangamon County until after the
rendition of a judgment in Sangamon County was in-
ferior in point of time to the Sangamon County judg-
ment which was rendered subsequent to the one in Cook
County. This case is in conflict with the numerous deci,
sions which hold that a judgment need not be a lien to
be the basis of a valid redemption.
EFFECT OF REDEMPTION BY JUDGMENT AND
DECREE CREDITORS
Until the redemption money is posted, a judgment
creditor has no right other than to demand payment of
his judgment and the holder of the certificate of sale
may, by paying his judgment, deprive him of his right
of redemption. If, however, a judgment creditor posts
his redemption money with the proper officer, the holder
of the certificate of sale or any other party interested
cannot prevent a redemption being made by him by ten-
dering to him the amount of his judgment. Having
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posted the redemption money and thus made a binding
bid for the property when it is offered for sale under and
by virtue of his redemption and his execution the judg-
ment creditor acquires a right of which he cannot be
divested, except with his consent. (McGowan v. Gold-
berg, 281 I11. 547). The posting of the redemption
money does not in itself complete the redemption and
if, with the consent of the judgment creditor, the holder
of the certificate pays his judgment, the holder of the
certificate will be entitled to a deed at the end of fifteen.
months. (Sutherland v. Long, 273 Ill. 309). The
Court in this case said: "Pending redemption proceed-
ings by a judgment creditor, the holder of the certificate
of purchase is not stripped of his rights and his interest
in the premises, and his certificate of purchase is not
extinguished until he actually accepts the redemption
money or until valid redemption proceedings have finally
culminated in a deed."
We have seen that to entitle a judgment creditor to
redeem after the twelve months period, he must have a
valid judgment upon which a valid sale may be made. If,
before he makes a redemption, the judgment creditor
causes the real estate to be sold to satisfy his judgment,
what then is his right to redeem? If he causes a sale
to be made of property other than the property sought
to be redeemed, he thereby loses his status as a judg-
ment creditor and cannot redeem as a judgment creditor.
He must redeem, if at all, as a defendant within the
twelve months period. If that period has expired, he
cannot redeem at all because his judgment has been sat-
isfied by the sale of property. This is the rule, also
where the judgment creditor before making a redemp-
tion causes the property from which he later seeks to
redeem to be sold to satisfy his judgment. His only
right to redeem would then be within the twelve months
period. His right to redeem as a judgment creditor
will have ceased. He is no longer a judgment creditor.
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His judgment has been satisfied by the sale of property.
If he allows the twelve months period to elapse, his right
to redemption is gone.
The effect of redemptions upon a homestead estate is
interesting and again illustrates the difference between a
redemption within twelve months and a redemption after
twelve months. If, for instance, a mortgage is fore-
closed in which the homestead was waived, a redemp-
tion within the twelve months would reinstate the home-
stead estate. The situation is altogether different when
a judgment creditor redeems after the twelve months.
While it is true his title is based upon his judgment and
a sheriff's sale and deed thereunder which ordinarily
would not cut out the homestead estate, yet by virtue
of the redemption as a judgment creditor he receives the
benefits which the original mortgagee acquired in his
original decree of foreclosure, so that if the homestead
was waived in the mortgage and the homestead of the
mortgagor was thereby foreclosed, the judgment cred-
itor making a redemption under his judgment takes title
free and clear of the homestead of the owner by virtue
of the original foreclosure. (Schroeder v. Bauer, 140
Ill. 135). This difference is aptly expressed in Butler
v. Brown, 205 Ill. 606 at page 609 "Appellees (being
the mortgagors) by their mortgage to Jane Hand had
made this release of homestead as provided in this Sec-
tion and it was therefore included in the foreclosure
sale of August 19, 1901. From that sale, however, the
appellant (the holder of the certificate of sale) could
redeem by virtue of Section 18 of our Statutes as one
interested in the premises, the only effect of his redemp-
tion, as provided in that Section, being to render null
and void the sale and certificate of the Master. No
greater right is conferred by that Section. If he had
redeemed as a judgment creditor, as provided by Sec-
tions 20 to 24 of the same Chapter, the right acquired
would have related back to the judgment or decree from
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which the redemption was made, and would be para-
mount to any title acquired subsequent to the beginning
of the lien of such judgment or decree and would, in
this case, have covered the homestead rights of the
appellees."
In order that the redemption by the judgment creditor
be a valid one, it is necessary first that the foreclosure
proceedings from which redemption is made be valid.
Even though the judgment is valid, if the foreclosure is
invalid, the redemption by the judgment creditor is void
and no title will be acquired thereby. (Mulvey v. Car-
penter, 78 Ill. 580).
It is necessary also that the judgment upon which re-
demption is made be against the holder or former holder
of the entire title. Thus, a redemption by the holder of
a judgment against a life-tenant gives to such judgment
creditor, the interest of the life-tenant only. (Schroeder
v. Bozarth, 224 Ill. 310). Where two parcels are sold
en masse and the ownership is in separate persons, a
judgment creditor of one of them upon redemption from
a foreclosure of both parcels acquires title only to the
lot owned by his judgment debtor. (Huber v. Hess,
191 Ill. 305). Likewise a judgment creditor having a
judgment against the holder of an undivided one-half
of the title obtains upon redemption from a sale of the
whole title, title only to the undivided one-half against
which his judgment was effective. (Sledge v. Dobbs,
254 Ill. 130).
Let us consider finally the effect of an invalid redemp-
tion. This situation was thoroughly discussed in two
cases decided by the Supreme Court, namely. Suther-
land v. Long 273 Ill. 309 and Hutson v. Wood, 263
Ill. 376. In the Sutherland case, the Court while decid-
ing that the judgment creditor did not make an invalid
redemption in the case before it, stated the following
principles: "If, after the expiration of the twelve
months, the premises are redeemed by one not a judg-
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ment creditor, the acceptance of the redemption money
by the holder of the certificate of purchase relieves the
legal title of the debtor from the lien of the certificate
of purchase even though the one redeeming cannot en-
force his claim by a resale of the land. Upon the ac-
ceptance of the money by the holder of the certificate, all
his interests would have been extinguished immediately
whether the judgment creditor had the right to redeem
or not." In Hutson v. Wood, 263 Ill. 376 the Court
summed up at length the law upon this subject in a splen-
didly written opinion and decreed the return of the re-
demption money which had been paid for an invalid re-
demption, saying: "The rule of caveat emptor applies
to sales upon execution and judicial sales, and we know
of no case where a purchaser at such a sale, in the ab-
sence of a statute, has been enabled to recover the money
paid, either for a defective title or where for want of
power to make the sale he has acquired no title. The
power of a sheriff to sell land upon execution and to con-
vey the land sold is statutory and depends upon the va-
lidity of the process, which, in turn, must be based upon
a valid judgment. If the judgment is void, the execu-
tion, sale and deed are necessarily void. Neither in
law or equity can a court aid the defective execution of
a power conferred by law whereby the title of one per-
son's property may be transferred to another. Wood
and Stotlar acquired no title by virtue of the sheriff's
sale and deed and have therefore no defense which they
can interpose to a suit for the possession. (Meyer v.
Mintonye, 106 Ill. 414). They did, however, purchase
at the void sale in good faith, in the belief that they
were obtaining a good title and the money they paid
extinguished the certificate of sale under the foreclosure
proceedings. It is contended, on the one hand, that they
are entitled, in equity, to be reimbursed the amount of
the encumbrance from which the land was relieved by
their payment before they can be deprived of its posses-
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sion. On the other hand, it is insisted that they are
volunteers, and having )advanced their money volun-
tarily on the faith of a void sale must abide the conse-
quences and are entitled to no relief. So far as the par-
tition suit involving Lot 23, in which Mrs. Hutson is
complainant and is asking to have the sale removed as a
cloud upon her title, is concerned, there can be no doubt
of the power of the court to compel her, as a condition
to granting the relief asked to reimburse Wood and
Stotlar for the amount paid to relieve her land of the
encumbrance. She is seeking equitable relief, and, un-
der the doctrine that he who seeks equity must do equity,
may be compelled, before relief will be granted, to do
what equity requires of her. This principle is con-
stantly applied in suits brought to set aside void tax
deeds, and the same rule applies to a suit to set aside a
deed upon a void execution sale."
It is to be noted here, however, that the purchasers at
the sale made pursuant to the redemption were not
parties to the judgment and the Court stressed the fact
that they were innocent purchasers. It is doubtful
whether or not the Court would make a similar decision
in a case where the judgment creditor himself was the
purchaser at the redemption sale. It seems to us that
he should be protected just as fully as third parties bid-
ding at the sale for the reason that his money has gone
to extinguish the certificate of sale and certainly any one
asking for equitable relief against him should be re-
quired to do equity for him just as much as for a third
party.
This principle of reimbursement, however, is quite
different from the rule laid down where a judgment is
effective as to part and invalid as to part as, for instance,
against one of two co-owners. In Sledge V. Dobbs,
Supra the Court specifically denied any claim for con-
tribution saying that the judgment creditor was pre-
sumed to have made the redemption in order to acquire
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the title of his judgment debtor and the fact that he in-
cidentally freed the property of his judgment debtor's
co-owner from the lien of the foreclosure sale gave him
no rights whatever in the title of said co-owner.
REDEMPTION BY A Co-TENANT
Section 26 of the Judgment Act (Chapter 77 Cahill's
Statutes) provides that any joint owner, his executors,
administrators or assigns or a decree or judgment credi-
tor of such joint owner may redeem the interest of such
joint owner in the premises sold on execution or decree
in the manner and upon the conditions specified in the
statute upon the payment of such proportion of the
amount which would be necessary to redeem the whole.
Thus, if the title is in two tenants in common during the
twelve months period, either one of them may redeem
his undivided one-half interest from the sale by tender-
ing one-half of the amount of the sale, costs, and inter-
ests. He would thereupon be entitled to his undivided
Dne-half while the purchaser at the end of the period,
if no further redemption was made, would be entitled
to a deed to an undivided one-half. Within the twelve
months period, however, a co-tenant who redeems all
of the property redeems for the benefit of all of his co-
owners and while entitled to contribution from them is
not entitled to make such redemption for his own sole
benefit. (Donason v. Barbero, 230 Ill. 138.) This
seems simple and probably would be simple were it not
for a decision rendered in Sledge v. Dobbs, 254 Ill. 130.
In this case, the title to the property in question was in
Sophronia A. Sledge and her husband, Joseph. They
executed a mortgage which was foreclosed. Twelve
months having expired, a judgment creditor of Joseph
Sledge made a redemption of the premises under and
by virtue of which the property was sold, and a Sheriff's
Deed issued. Of course, since the judgment was only
upon the undivided interest of the husband, there seems
to be no doubt that the Sheriff's Deed based on such
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redemption could and did convey only such undivided in-
terest. However, the Court made the following state-
ment which can hardly be reconciled with the language
of Section 26 of the statute: "There was no obligation
upon the judgment creditors of Joseph J. Sledge to re-
deem the land from the mortgage sale. It is true if
they redeem at all they will be required to pay the whole
amount the land sold for, and this would free the land
from any lien on account of said mortgage sale." In
this case, it was decided that a redemption having been
made by paying all of the redemption money, the in-
terest of Sophronia was freed from the mortgage debt
and she retained her fee title 'free and clear not only of
the lien of the certificate of sale but even of the necessity
to contribute to such judgment creditor for any portion
of the redemption money. In view of the language of
Section 26, we hesitate to agree with the statement that
the judgment creditor was forced to redeem in full in
order to make a redemption of an undivided interest.
The case is undoubtedly correct to the extent that it
holds that if a judgment creditor of one co-tenant pays
the redemption money in full, he acquires only the title
of the co-tenant against whom he holds a judgment and
the tide of both co-tenants is completely freed from the
lien of the mortgage sale. (Sutherland v. Long, 273
I1l. 309 at page 315).
In favor of the right of a judgment creditor of one
co-tenant to redeem by paying only a proportionate
share of the redemption money, the case of Schuck v.
Gerlach, 101 Ill. 338 seems to point out a more sensible
rule to be applied in this kind of a case. The facts were
that the mortgagor died, and his heirs, five in number
became seized of the equity of redemption by descent
After foreclosure and sale, they having failed to redeem,
creditors having judgments against two of them each re-
deemed an undivided one-fifth by tendering one-fifth of
the redemption money. When this had been completed,
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a third creditor having a judgment against the deceased
mortgagor whereby he was entitled to redeem the entire
premises, attempted to make a redemption by tendering
the entire redemption money. The Court held that the
redemptions by the two creditors having judgments
against two of the heirs were valid and that the creditor
of the mortgagor was entitled to redeem and acquire
by his redemption only the remaining undivided three-
fifths. Therefore, with reference to property owned
jointly, it seems to be the law, (1) that a creditor of
each co-tenant may redeem the share of the co-tenant
against whom he holds a judgment by depositing the
proportionate share of the redemption money. (2) If,
however, in error the judgment creditor deposits the en-
tire redemption money the remaining co-tenants against
whom he has no judgment regain their title freed from
all lien created by the foreclosure sale and the redeem-
ing creditor is not entitled to contribution. (3) A re-
demption by one creditor of one co-tenant is no bar to a
redemption of the balance of the title by another cred-
itor having a judgment against the holder of the balance
of the title with which he might redeem the remaining
portion from such a sale. (4) Within the first twelve
months, a co-owner may redeem his share without re-
deeming the whole but if he does redeem the whole, he
does so for the joint benefit of all the owners and while
entitled to contribution is not entitled to the entire title.
REDEMPTION BY A CLAIMANT UNDER A CLAIM FILED
IN THE PROBATE COURT
Section 27 of the Judgment Act provides that any
person having a claim in the Probate Court against the
estate of a deceased debtor shall be considered a judg-
ment creditor. Redemption in such a case is quite simi-
lar to the redemption of a judgment creditor and this
Section authorizes the issuance of a special execution by
the Clerk of the Probate Court, directed to the Sheriff,
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authorizing him to levy on and sell the property from
which redemption is sought. The holder of this execu-
tion is in the same position from this period on as the
holder of an execution under a judgment.
As stated above, any claim properly allowed may be
the basis of such redemption, even though the claim was
one arising subsequent to the date of the death of the
debtor, as for instance, one arising for the funeral ex-
penses of the debtor. The case of Zeman v. Ward, 260
Ill. 93 is probably the best one upon redemptions under
claims in the Probate Court. In Zeman v. Ward, Supra
it was urged that the claimant before being permitted
to make a redemption should file a petition, give notice
to the heirs and allege the insufficiency of the personal
assets to pay all claims against the estate as in the case
of the proceedings in the Probate Court to sell the real
estate of the decedent to pay debts. The Court, how-
ever, held that none of these things was required by the
Statute and that the Statute does not make the right to
redeem contingent upon the insolvency of the estate or
the insufficiency of the personal assets and does not re-
quire a petition to the Court or notice to any one.
EFFECT OF REDEMPTION ON RENTS, ISSUES
AND PROFITS
In the absence of any express provision in a trust deed
or mortgage sought to be foreclosed, the rents, issues
and profits during the period provided for redemption,
belong to the owner of the fee, that is, the owner of the
right to redeem. (Standish v. Musgrove, 223 Ill. 500).
This is based upon the theory that the holder of the cer-
tificate of sale has no interest in the premises foreclosed
except the right either to the return of his money by re-
demption or to a deed to the premises at the expiration
of the statutory period of redemption.
It has long been the law that the owner of the indebt-
edness upon which foreclosure is sought may also file a
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petition to have a receiver appointed to manage and con-
trol the mortgaged property without any specific au-
thority to do so in the trust deed. Whether or not a
receiver should be appointed rests within the discretion
of the Court and depends primarily upon the proof that
the property was scant security for the mortgage sought
to be foreclosed. (Orlengen v. Rice, 104 Ill. App.
428). This remedy, however, was more or less uncer-
tain since it depended upon the discretion of the judge
presiding at the hearing. To overcome this, the mod-
ern form of trust deeds almost universally contains a
provision to the effect that pending foreclosure proceed-
ings, a receiver may be appointed. Under such a grant
of authority a receiver may be appointed without regard
to the solvency of the mortgagor or the security of the
property. (Bagley v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank,
199 Ill. 76). If, pursuant to such foreclosure proceed-
ings the property is sold and upon such sale the full
amount of the decree is obtained, the owner of the right
to redeem may petition to have the receiver discharged
since there is no longer need for him, the mortgage hav-
ing been paid in full by the sale. (Davis v. Dale, 150
Ill. 239. Bogardus v. Moses, 181 Ill. 554).
A different question arises, however, when there is a
deficiency found due the mortgagee after the sale of the
premises. In the absence of any provision pledging the
rents, issues and profits of the property during the
period of redemption, the mortgagee is not, as a matter
of right, entitled to receive the rents during such period,
such relief depending upon the discretion of the Court.
(Ball v. Marske, 202 Ill. 31. Schaeppi v. Bartholomae,
217 111. 105). To avoid this situation, the modern
form of trust deed contains a pledge of such rents, is-
sues and profits during the period of redemption as fur-
ther security for the mortgage debt. Such a pledge is
valid and under it the Court has authority to continue
the receiver in possession of the premises during the stat-
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utory period of redemption. Thus, if a redemption is
made by one not personally liable for the deficiency and
if the rents are pledged in the mortgage and if, in addi-
tion, the decree orders the continuance of the receiver-
ship, such receiver could probably collect the rents, is-
sues and profits during the entire fifteen months apply-
ing them upon the deficiency even though there has been
a redemption from the sale. (Oakford v. Robinson, 48
Ill. App. 270). Still another question arises. May a re-
ceiver be continued after redemption if notwithstanding
a pledge of rents in a mortgage the decree of fore-
closure fails to provide for the collection of the rents to
satisfy any deficiency there may be? Upon this point
the law is less certain, but the answer to the question
seems to depend not merely upon the holder of the right
to redeem being personally liable for the deficiency, but
also whether or not the holder of the right to redeem
purchased the same before or after the entry of the de-
cree of foreclosure. Under the decision in Lightcap v.
Bradley, 186 Ill. 510 as we have seen all the rights of
the mortgagee merge in the decree of foreclosure and
subsequent purchasers need look only to the decree to
determine the condition of the foreclosure. From this it
would seem to follow that if subsequent to the decree a
person not liable for the deficiency should purchase the
right to redeem and redeem, he would be entitled to
have the receiver discharged immediately notwithstand-
ing the trust deed foreclosed contained an express pledge
of rents and profits. However, an entirely different
situation arises if he purchased prior to the decree of
foreclosure, even though he is not liable primarily for
the debt, for in this case it would probably be held that
he purchased the property subject to the mortgage and'
to all of its terms and the subsequent omission in the
decree might not relieve him of the pledge of rents. If
in such a case, a receiver is appointed during the fore-
closure proceedings, he probably can continue to collect
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the rents pledged in the mortgage and apply them upon
the deficiency decree even though redemption is made
before the fifteen months period expires by one not liable
for the deficiency. (Oakford v. Robinson, 48 Ill. App.
270). In this case, the Court said: "Appellee's title
to the property was subject to the mortgage and his
right to the rents and profits of the land was, under
the mortgage and decree of Court, secondary to that of
the appellants (mortgagees). The payment by the
appellee to the Master in Chancery of the amount requi-
site under the Statute to effect redemption from the sale
did not operate to destroy the lien of the appellants and
such lien remained unaffected by the redemption and
could only be satisfied by the payment of the deficiency
or by the application by the receiver of the rents and
profits toward the payment of such unpaid balance."
This decision -has been several times cited with approval
and in Owsley v. Neeves, 179 I11. App. 61, the Court
said: "Rents and profits are the subject of mortgage.
The mortgagee has a specific lien upon the rents and
profits of mortgaged land when they are expressly
pledged by the mortgage as part of the security. The
appellant was bound by those terms of the trust deed
and the chancellor could not legally or equitably decree
otherwise than that the appellees were entitled to have
their deficiency decree or judgment paid out of the rents
in question." To the same effect is Townsend v. Wil-
son, 155 Ill. App. 303. This being the uncertain state
of the law, it would be unsafe to assume that a redemp-
tion terminates every receivership. Where the rents are
specifically pledged in the trust deed foreclosed, it is
probable that our Courts will permit the receiver to re-
main in possession for the full fifteen months, notwith-
standing a redemption by one not liable for the payment
of the deficiency decree.
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REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 19 OF THE
CHANCERY ACT
In addition to the statutory rights of redemption here-
tofore discussed another right of redemption exists from
all sales made under and by virtue of decrees in chan-
cery in favor of defendants served by publication. The
importance of this right of redemption is not fully ap-
preciated by Illinois lawyers nor is there a proper under-
standing of the serious effect upon the marketability of
titles and the collectibility of mortgages or other liens
which must be enforced in equity. In the majority of
cases of foreclosure of liens in the City of Chicago there
exists a three year right of redemption in favor of some
of the detendants to the suit for reasons which will ap-
pear as we progress. The result is that it actually takes
three years or more to make a collection of the money
due on a mortgage or mechanic's lien. There are upon
our Statute Book several Sections (Sections 7 and 12,
Chapter 22, Cahill's Illinois Statutes) which provide for
suing persons who have or may have an interest in the
property which is the subject matter of the suit where
such persons reside beyond the boundaries of this State
or cannot be found. Such persons may be sued and
brought before the Court by the publication of a notice
in the manner prescribed by the Statute. In case there
are persons who have or may have an interest in the
property which is the subject matter of the suit, whose
names are unknown, they may be made defendants by
the designation of "unknown owners," and publication
may also be made against them to bring them before
the Court. In Illinois and particularly in Chicago and
its suburbs it has long been the practice to lend money
on real estate, taking as evidence of the debt, notes pay-
able to bearer which are secured by a trust deed run-
ning usually to a corporate trustee. Nothing appears
on the records showing the ownership of the notes and
trust deed. If, therefore, there are two or three trust
REDEMPTIONS FROM JUDICIJL SALES
deeds on a piece of property, the holder of the first
trust deed seeking to foreclose it must make parties de-
fendant not only the trustee in the subordinate trust
deeds, but also the owner of the notes. Since the record
does not show the ownership of the notes and the
trustee seldom knows the facts the complainant is
driven to make the owners of such notes defendants by
the designation of unknown owners of notes. He pro-
ceeds to a decree of sale and we come then to the rights
of these unknown owners to redeem. Section 19 of the
Chancery Act, Chapter 22, Cahill's Statutes provides
that "when any final decree shall be entered against any
defendant who shall not have been summoned or been
served with a copy of the bill or received the notice re-
quired to be sent him by mail and such person, his heirs,
devisees, executor, administrator or other legal repre-
sentatives, as the case may require, shall within one
year after notice in writing given him of such decree or
within three years after such decree, if no such notice
shall have been given as aforesaid, appear in open
Court and petition to be heard touching the matter of
such decree, and shall pay such costs as the Court shall
deem reasonable in that behalf. The person so peti-
tioning may appear and answer the complainants' bill,
and thereupon such proceedings shall be had as if the
defendants had appeared in due season, and no decree
had been made. And if it shall appear, upon the hear-
ing, that such decree ought not to have been made
against such defendant, the same may be set aside, al-
tered or amended as shall appear just; otherwise the
same shall be ordered to stand confirmed against said
defendant." The statute is absolutely silent on the
matter of redemption. The language of the statute
would seem to limit the right of the parties served by
publication to having the decree reviewed and modified
or vacated, if upon their defense the Court should deem
that relief proper. But our decisions leave no room for
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doubt that the Statute grants an absolute right to re-
deem within three years from the date of the decree re-
gardless of whether or not the decree was altered or
amended. See Seymour v. Bailey, 66 Illinois 288.
Northern Trust Company v. Sanford, 308 Illinois 381.
It has become the habit of many lawyers to add to the
list of defendants in foreclosure suits not only "unknown
owners of certain notes specifically described," but "un-
known owners" generally. Their idea, as we gather
it, is to be sure every one is before the Court and that
thereby a perfect proceeding is being conducted. We
have encountered many cases where there was no neces-
sity whatever for making unknown owners defendants.
That is, there were no Junior Trust Deeds and nothing
of record to require it, and yet "unknown owners"
were sued. The result of such procedure is to create a
three year period of redemption which would otherwise
not exist at all, thereby making the title practically un-
salable for three years and postponing the collection of
the debt for a like period. This is very unwise practice
and should be discontinued. Likewise we have often
seen cases where non-resident persons have been served
by publication in foreclosure cases when it was possible
to serve them by copy of the bill. Had they been served
in that manner their right of redemption would have
expired at the end of 15 months from the date of the
sale. But because they were published against their
right to redeem extended during 3 years from the entry
of the decree.
Such is the three year period of redemption under
our Laws and it is hoped that the money lenders who
suffer the most from laws which make it difficult for
them to collect their loans will sometime seek relief by
appealing to the Legislature for a modification of this
Section of our Statute.
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CONCLUSION
We have, we believe, discusjsed all the important
problems which arise in this difficult branch of Real
Property Law. There are, of course, many minor
points which have not been touched upon and there are
many decisions which have not been cited. Our only
hope is that this essay may prove to be of some value
to those who may find occasion to stray in this labyrinth
of law.
ADDENDA
Since this article was written the Supreme Court has
rendered its decision in Hack v. Snow discussed herein.
The Appellate Court decision was reversed and the
earlier decisions of the Supreme Court (Davenport v.
Karnes, 70 Ill. 465 and Burgett v. Paxton, 99 Ill. 288)
were adhered to. The Supreme Court held that the ef-
fect of the redemption was merely to defeat the rights
of the holder of the certificate of sale and to leave the
title in the redeeming owner, subject to the lien of the
Liesik Judgment. The Court also recognized the doc-
trine that if a decree orders the sale of property to sat-
isfy both a senior and junior lien (which is proper only
when the junior lienor has filed a cross bill in the cause)
and there is a sale for enough only to pay the senior lien,
a redemption by the owner or his grantee will have the
effect of freeing his title from the unpaid balance due the
junior lienor.
